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Consider an exchange economy in which consumers have private information
at the interim stage when state contingent contracts are made. Each agent
knows her private information and has some probability assessment over the
true information of others. We study an environment in which the only con-
straints on enforcing agreements are those arising from the incompleteness
of information. A coalition can agree on a feasible state contingent contract
(or net-trades) which is enforced by an agency using the private information
reported by the agents. Naturally then, contracts need to be subjected to
incentive compatibility constraints. An appropriate notion of the core pro-
vides a natural cooperative equilibrium concept for the problem of resource
allocation in such an economy. One of the critical issues that arises in deﬁn-
ing an appropriate core notion - and our central concern in the present paper
- is the speciﬁcation of the information that agents in a coalition are allowed
to use in constructing an objection. In what way, if any, can members of a
coalition share their private information? Put diﬀerently, over what kind of
informational event is a coalition permitted to object? It should be borne in
mind that this issue does not arise in deﬁning the core at the ex ante stage;
see Forges, Minelli and Vohra (2002) for additional discussion.
Wilson (1978), developed two distinct approaches that deal with this
issue, and lead respectively to the notions of the coarse core and the ﬁne
core.1 The coarse core is based on the assumption that a coalition can focus
its potential objection on an event if and only if the event is commonly
known to all members of the coalition. Thus the act of forming an objecting
coalition does not change the private information of any agent. The ﬁne core
is based on the idea that the act of forming a coalition allows all members of
the coalition to decide how much of their private information they wish to
share with each other.
Thus, the coarse and ﬁne cores correspond to two extreme informational
assumptions on coalitional behavior - the former rules out information shar-
ing or leakage while the latter permits arbitrary sharing of information. We
argue that both of these polar cases are subject to criticism. In particular,
we show by means of an example that there may be circumstances in which
it is reasonable for coalitions to coordinate their actions on an event which
1Wilson assumed that all informationwas publicly veriﬁable at the time of enforcement,
and hence did not have to impose incentive compatibility. Our primary concern here will
be with the incentive compatible versions of Wilson’s core notions.
1is not a common knowledge event. Another example demonstrates that the
ﬁne core is also unreasonable since agents may not be able to pool their
information in a credible manner.
In view of this discussion, it is natural to ask whether the theory can
provide insights into the amount of private information that coalitions can be
reasonably expected to pool. Recent work that considers such issues includes
Forges (1994), Krasa (2000), Ichiishi and Sertel (1998), Lee and Volij (2002)
and Volij (2000). In this paper our main aim is to make endogenous the
information that is pooled in a coalition. We develop a notion of the core in
which coalitions are allowed to coordinate their actions over an event that
can be credibly inferred from the objection being contemplated.
Our notion of credible objections is meant to capture the following idea.
Suppose a contract is under consideration as an objection by a coalition, and
agent i in the coalition claims that she is of type si. This claim is considered
credible if agent i would prefer the new contract to the status-quo if and only
if she were indeed of type si. Other agents should, therefore, be able to infer
i’s statement regarding the informational event. This notion of credibility
is closely related to that of credible updating used by Grossman and Perry
(1986) in deﬁning perfect sequential equilibrium; see also Cho and Kreps
(1987) and Kahn and Mookherjee (1995).
The credible core is the set of allocations to which there is no credible
objection. It lies between the incentive compatible ﬁne core and the incentive
compatible coarse core. We use several examples to illustrate the diﬀerences,
and provide a positive result on the non-emptiness of the credible core in
economies with quasi linear utilities.2 In particular, the credible core is non-
empty in an auction of a single commodity in the case of private values or
interdependent values satisfying the single crossing property.
2 The Model
In this Section we describe the basic model of an exchange economy with
incomplete information. Since our main interest lies in analyzing an envi-
ronment in which private information cannot be veriﬁed at the enforcement
stage, we shall impose incentive compatibility constraints on all contracts.
2The non-emptiness issue is important because the incentive compatible coarse core (of
which the credible core is a subset) can be empty in general, as shown in Vohra (1999)
and Forges, Mertens and Vohra (2002).
2For this reason, we ﬁnd it convenient to formulate private information in
terms of agents’ types.
Let Ti denote the (ﬁnite) set of agent i’s types. The interpretation is
that ti ∈ Ti denotes the private information possessed by agent i. With
N = {1,...,n} as the ﬁnite set of agents, let T =
Q
i∈N Ti. An information
state for the economy refers to t ∈ T. We will use the notation t−i to denote
(tj)j6=i. Similarly T−i =
Q
j6=i Tj, and for any coalition S, a non-empty subset
of N, tS =( ti)i∈S and TS =
Q
i∈S Ti.
We assume that there is a (common) prior probability distribution q de-
ﬁned on T. This is without loss of generality, except in section 5, where we
assume quasi linear preferences.3 Let T ∗ = {t ∈ T | q(t) > 0}. We assume
that none of the types is redundant in the sense that for every i ∈ N and
ti ∈ Ti, there exists t−i ∈ T−i such that (t−i,t i) ∈ T ∗. We can now deﬁne, for
i ∈ N and ¯ ti ∈ Ti, the conditional probability of t−i ∈ T−i, given ¯ ti as:







We assume that there are l commodities, and each consumer has a con-
sumption set Xi =I R
l
+ (for each state). Agent i’s endowment is deﬁned as a
function ω : Ti 7→ Xi, where ωi(ti) denotes i’s endowment when her type is
ti. Each consumer has a state dependent utility function ui :I R
l × T 7→ IR .
We will denote by ui(.,t) the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of
agent i in state t. We assume that for each i ∈ N and t ∈ T, ui(.,t)i s
continuous and concave, and for all x ∈ IR
l
+, ui(x,t) ≥ ui(0,t).
A state contingent allocation is a function x : T 7→
Q
i Xi. Henceforth,
we shall refer to a state contingent allocation simply as an allocation. The
set of feasible allocations for the grand coalition is deﬁned as:









ωi(ti), for all t ∈ T}.
An allocation for coalition S is a function x : T 7→
Q
i∈S Xi, and is said





i∈S ωi(ti) for all t ∈ T.
3If no restrictions are imposed on preferences, then the common priors assumption can
always be satisﬁed by appropriate rescaling of utilities and probabilities. However, quasi-
linearity imposes an additional restriction, and in that case the necessary rescaling may
not be possible without violating quasi linearlity.
3(b) xi(t)=xi(t0) for all i ∈ S, t,t0 ∈ T such that tS = t0
S.
Requirement (b) reﬂects the idea that a coalition cannot rely on the
participation of outsiders in choosing its mechanism. If information becomes
publicly veriﬁable at the enforcement stage there may be no reason to insist
on (b). The set of feasible allocations for coalition S is denoted AS.
2.1 The Coarse Core
Suppose agents in a coalition do not (or cannot) share their private infor-
mation. They can then coordinate their actions only over an event that is
commonly known to them. A non-empty event E ⊆ T, is said to be a com-
mon knowledge event for coalition S if q(ˆ t−i,t i) = 0 for all i ∈ S, t ∈ E and
(ˆ t−i,t i) / ∈ E.
For an event E ⊆ T, deﬁne for each i ∈ N, the set of types of i compatible
with the event E as
Ei = {ti ∈ Ti | (t0
−i,t i) ∈ E for some t0
−i ∈ T−i}.
The conditional expected utilityof consumer i corresponding to allocation
x, conditional on her being of type ti,i s











Accordingly, y ∈ AS dominates x ∈ AN for S over a common knowledge
event E if
Ui(yi | ti) >U i(xi | ti) for all ti ∈ Ei for all i ∈ S. (D0)
In addition to physical feasibility and domination, we also need to impose
incentive compatibility constraints to ensure that an objecting allocation can
be implemented by the coalition when private information cannot be veriﬁed.
Consider an allocation y. By pretending to be of type si, when her true
type is ti, agent i can obtain the net-trade corresponding to the state (t−i,s i)
when the true state is t. Let the corresponding commodity bundle be denoted
yi(t−i,s i | ti)=yi(t−i,s i) − ωi(t−i,s i)+ωi(ti).
This deception yields conditional expected utility








−i,s i | ti),(t
0
−i,t i)).
4We shall assume that a deception that leads to bankruptcy can never be
proﬁtable. This is equivalent to extending the domain of the utility function
such that ui(yi,t)=−∞ for all yi / ∈ IR
l
+, for all i ∈ N and t ∈ T.
An allocation y is said to be incentive compatible for coalition S if
Ui(yi | ti) ≥ Ui(yi,s i | ti) for all si,t i ∈ Ti, for all i ∈ S. (IC0)
Coalition S has an incentive compatible, coarse objection to an incentive
compatible allocation x ∈ AN if there exists y ∈ AS and an event E that is
common knowledge for S such that (D0) and (IC0) hold.4 By the revelation
principle, the set of incentive compatible allocations is identical to those
which can be truthfully implemented as Bayesian Nash equilibria of a direct
mechanism. An allocation can therefore be viewed as a mechanism. It is
also worth pointing out that in this context, the assumption of free disposal
which we implicitly made in deﬁning feasible allocations for a coalition is
no longer innocuous. A coalition may be able to do better if free disposal
is allowed in the presence of incentive constraints; see Forges, Mertens and
Vohra (2002) and Forges, Minelli and Vohra (2002) for examples.
The incentive compatible, coarse core consists of all incentive compatible
allocations x ∈ AN to which there exists no incentive compatible, coarse
objection.5
2.2 The Fine Core
Suppose coalition S considers an event E ⊆ T over which to coordinate its
actions through an allocation. The theory depends critically on the restric-
tions that are imposed on such an event. There are some basic restrictions
which should always be imposed on such an event. Diﬀerences in various core
notions will then depend on additional restrictions that might be imposed.
It turns out that the basic restrictions we discuss below are already implicit
4One may argue that the incentive compatibility constraints as expressed in (IC0) are
too strong; it should be enough to require these constraints over the common knowledge
event E. Fortunately, as we will show in Proposition 2.1 below, this would not alter the
notion of an incentive compatible, coarse objection.
5The corresponding core notion without incentive constraints is the coarse core of
Wilson (1978). It consists of all allocations to which there exists no coarse objection
(requiring (D’) but not (IC’)). Incentive constraints were incorporated into the coarse core
in Vohra (1999). Allen (1992) was the ﬁrst to introduce incentive constraints in studying
the ex ante core.
5in an event which is commonly known to a coalition.6
To consider the possibility that a coalition may be able to act over an
event that is not necessarily commonly known to all members of the coalition,
suppose all members of coalition S believe that the true state belongs to a
non-empty set E ⊆ T. Clearly, there are some natural restrictions that
ought to be imposed on E (if E is not a common knowledge event) for
such beliefs to be reasonable. First, it must be the case that E can be
discerned without using the private information of those not in the coalition.
So, if S considers an event E then a proﬁle of types of agents outside S,
t0
−S ∈ T−S, can be excluded from E only if this is discernible with the private
information of agents in S. Moreover, since all our domination notions will
be based on evaluating conditional utilities, we can express this requirement
as E = ES × T−S. Second, E must reﬂect independent claims by members
of a coalition in a mechanism. In other words, i’s claim that she is not of
type ti cannot depend on claims by other members of S. So, ES must be
the Cartesian product of the individual Ei’s. Hence, E =[
Q
i∈S Ei] × T−S,
where Ei ⊆ Ti for all i. Finally, E must be consistent with what each of
the agents in the coalition know, given their private information. No agent,
knowing her type, should rule out the possibility that the true state lies in
E. In other words, for all i ∈ S and ti ∈ Ei, q(E | ti) > 0.
Thus, a non-empty event E ⊆ T is said to be admissible for coalition S




Ei×T−S, where Ei ⊆ Ti and q(E | ti) > 0 for all t ∈ E, for all i ∈ S.
Suppose a coalition can act over an admissible event E. The notion
of domination used in (D0) needs to be modiﬁed to take account of the
information that is contained in E.
The probability that agent i assigns to t ∈ E, conditional on her type











Note that if E is an admissible event, this expression is well-deﬁned since
q(E | ti) > 0 for t ∈ E. We can now deﬁne for each i ∈ S and a type ti ∈ Ei,
6This will also make it clear that our deﬁnition of the incentive compatible, coarse core
above is the same as the deﬁnition used in Vohra (1999).
6the conditional expected utility (conditional on E), for an allocation x as











For coalition S, y ∈ AS dominates x ∈ AN over an admissible event E if
Ui(yi | ti,E) >U i(xi | ti,E) for all ti ∈ Ei for all i ∈ S. (D)
If coalition S uses the information corresponding to an admissible event
E, we shall need to consider incentive compatibility with respect to E. Given
an allocation y and an admissible event E, the conditional expected utility
(conditional on the information provided by E) to agent i of type ti by
pretending to be of type si is deﬁned as








−i,s i | ti),(t
0
−i,t i)).
An allocation y is said to be incentive compatible over an admissible event
E for coalition S if
Ui(yi | ti,E) ≥ Ui(yi,s i | ti,E) for all si,t i ∈ Ei, for all i ∈ S. (IC)
Coalition S has an incentive compatible, ﬁne objection to an incentive
compatible allocation x ∈ AN if there exists y ∈ AS and an admissible event
E for S such that (D) and (IC) hold.
The incentive compatible, ﬁne core consists of all incentive compatible
allocations x ∈ AN to which there exists no incentive compatible, ﬁne objec-
tion.
The ﬁne core consists of all allocations x to which there exists no ﬁne
objection, i.e., there exists no coalitionS, an admissible eventE and a feasible
allocation y satisfying (D).
It is easy to see that an allocation x that belongs to any of the cores we
have deﬁned must satisfy interim individually rationality in the sense that
Ui(xi | ti) ≥ Ui(ωi | ti) for all i ∈ N, ti ∈ Ti.
To clarify the essential diﬀerence between the incentivecompatible, coarse
core and the incentive compatible, ﬁne core it is important to check that the
domination and incentive compatibility conditions are, in fact, the same in
7each case. Conditions (D) and (IC) in deﬁning a ﬁne objection reﬂect the fact
that agents update their prior probability assessments based on the pooled
information. No such updating is required in a coarse objection since no
additional information becomes available to any agent through the process
of constructing an objection over a common knowledge event. It can also
be shown that imposing admissibility on a common knowledge event would
imply no loss of generality. Since both the coarse core and the ﬁne core
satisfy interim individual rationality, the essential diﬀerence between these
core notions is explained in the following result.
Proposition 2.1 Suppose x is interim individually rational. Coalition S
has an incentive compatible, coarse objection to x (over an event E which is
common knowledge for S), if and only if S has an incentive compatible, ﬁne
objection to x over an (admissible) event E0 which is common knowledge for
S.
Proof: Suppose y ∈ AS is an incentive compatible, coarse objection of
coalition S to x over a common knowledge event E. Let E0
i = Ei = {ti ∈ Ti |
(t0
−i,t i) ∈ E for some t0
−i ∈ T−i}, and let E0 =
Q
i∈S E0
i ×T−S. Of course, E0
is a common knowledge event for S since E ⊆ E0. Since no type is redundant,
and E0 is a common knowledge event, it follows that q(E0 | ti) > 0 for
all t ∈ E0 and all i ∈ S. Thus E0 is an admissible event. Since E0 is
a common knowledge event, it follows that for every i ∈ S and t ∈ E0,
q(t−i | ti,E0)=q(t−i | ti). Thus, Ui(yi | ti,E0)=Ui(yi | ti). Since (D0) holds
for all ti ∈ Ei = E0
i for all i ∈ S, this implies (D). Of course, (IC0) implies
(IC)o v e rE0. Thus, y is a ﬁne objection by S over a common knowledge
(admissible) event E0.
To prove the converse, suppose y is an incentive compatible ﬁne objection
by S over E, a common knowledge, admissible event E. Deﬁne ˜ y such that
for all i ∈ S,
˜ yi(t)=
(
yi(t)i f t ∈ E
ωi(t) otherwise.
We now claim that ˜ y is an incentive compatible coarse objection by S to x
over the event E. Since E is a common knowledge event, for all t ∈ E and
i ∈ S,
Ui(˜ yi | ti,E)=Ui(yi | ti,E)=Ui(yi | ti).
8Thus (D) implies (D0). It remains to be shown that (IC) implies (IC’).
Condition (IC) means that
Ui(˜ yi | ti) ≥ Ui(˜ yi,s i | ti) for all si,t i ∈ Ei for all i ∈ S.
To establish (IC’) we have to show that incentive compatibility holds even
for ti / ∈ Ei or si / ∈ Ei. Suppose ti / ∈ Ei. Now, the fact that E is a common
knowledge event implies that
q(t
0
−i,t i) > 0 only if t0




−i,s i)=ωi(ti) for all si ∈ Ti and t0
−i / ∈ E−i.
Thus, if ti / ∈ Ei, agent i expects no-trade in every state that he believes
possible:
Ui(˜ yi | ti)=Ui(˜ yi,s i | ti)=Ui(ωi | ti).
The only remaining case is one in which ti ∈ Ei and si / ∈ Ei. This kind of lie
results in no-trade, and cannot be proﬁtable because
Ui(yi | ti) >U i(xi | ti) ≥ Ui(ωi | ti),
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from (D) and the second from the interim
individual rationality of x.
Proposition 2.1 shows that we can take admissibility, (D) and (IC)t o
be the necessary conditions in deﬁning an objection. The coarse core adds
to these conditions the requirement that objections are only permitted over
common knowledge events. Clearly then, the incentive compatible, ﬁne core
is a subset of the incentive compatible, coarse core.
It is important to keep in mind that both (D) and (IC) are deﬁned with
respect to an admissible event E, reﬂecting the updated probability assess-
ments inherent in E. In particular, a ﬁne objection by S over a particular
state, i.e., a ﬁne objection by S over an event E =
Q
i∈S{ti}×T−S, makes
condition (IC) redundant. Thus an allocation in the incentive compatible
ﬁne core must necessarily be ex-post eﬃcient in the sense of Holmstr¨ om and
Myerson (1983).7 Moreover, as Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2000) show, in
7The fact that an allocation in the ﬁne core is ex-post eﬃcient again points to the fact
that an incentive compatible, ﬁne objection may rely on an agent to believe unveriﬁable
(and unreasonable) claims by another.
9an atomless economy, the ﬁne core is a subset of the ex post core, i.e., a ﬁne
core allocation has the property that in each state, the allocation is a core
allocation of the full information economy for that state.
As is well known, even in the two-consumer case, there might not exist
any incentive compatible and interim individually rational allocation which
is ex-post eﬃcient (see, for example, Holmstr¨ om and Myerson (1983) and
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)). The incentive compatible, ﬁne core may
therefore be empty even in a two-consumer economy.8
The incentivecompatible, coarse core is non-empty in (well-behaved) two-
consumer economies. It is also non-empty if preferences are linear (Ichi-
ishi and Idzik (1996) and Vohra (1999)), if the information is non-exclusive
(Vohra (1999)).9 However,there do exist well-behaved, three-consumer economies
in which it is empty, as shown in Vohra (1999) and Forges, Mertens and Vohra
(2002).
3 Credible Information Pooling
We shall argue that in some cases pooling of information is reasonable while
in others it is not. Our aim is to formalize a notion of credible pooling of
private information and a corresponding notion of a credible core. We begin
with two simple, motivating examples. The ﬁrst illustrates a situation in
which information pooling seems reasonable, and provides a critique of the
coarse core. The second illustrates a situation in which information pooling
does not seem reasonable, and provides a critique of the ﬁne core. These
examples will also serve to introduce our notion of credibility.
Example 3.1
There are three consumers in an economy with two commodities. Each
consumer i can be of two possible types. Let Ti = {ai,b i}. Of the eight
information states, only three arise with positive probability. These states
are denoted
t
1 =( a1,b 2,b 3),t
2 =( b1,a 2,b 3) t
3 =( b1,b 2,a 3).
8Wilson (1978) constructs a three-consumer example in which the ﬁne core is empty.
Recall that Wilson did not impose incentive compatibility.
9Forges (2004) shows that the incentive compatible coarse core is non-empty in two-
person assignment models when random mechanisms are allowed.
10All consumers have identicalpriors q, where q(t)=1 /3 for t ∈ T ∗ = {t1,t 2,t 3)
and q(t) = 0 for all t/ ∈ T ∗. In each state with positive probability there is
exactly one consumer who is fully informed; consumer i is the informed agent
in state ti.
The endowments are as follows:
ωi(ti)=
(
(1,0) if ti = bi
(0.5,0.5) if ti = ai
For x =( x1,x 2) ∈ IR
2




1.5(x1 + x2)i f t = t3
x1 + x2 otherwise
u2(x,t)=
(
1.5(x1 + x2)i f t = t1
x1 + x2 otherwise
u3(x,t)=
(
1.5(x1 + x2)i f t = t2
x1 + x2 otherwise
Notice that both commodities are perfect substitutes. For an allocation x
let ψ(x) denote the sum of the two commodities allocated to each consumer,
i.e., ψi(x,t)=xi1(t)+xi2(t). It can be shown that x belongs to the incentive
compatible coarse core if and only if
ψ(x,t
1)=( 1 + δ1,2−δ1,0),ψ (x,t
2)=( 0 ,1+δ2,2−δ2),ψ (x,t
3)=( 2 −δ3,0,1+δ3)
where δ1,δ 2,δ 3 ∈ [0,1/3].
The incentive compatible, coarse core contains in particular the allocation
¯ x(t), where ¯ xi(t)=ωi(t) for t/ ∈ T ∗ and
¯ x(t1)=( ( 0 .5,0.5),(2,0),(0,0))
¯ x(t2)=( ( 0 ,0),(0.5,0.5),(2,0))
¯ x(t3)=( ( 2 ,0),(0,0),(0.5,0.5))
This allocation is not in the incentive compatible, ﬁne core.10 Consumers 1
and 3 have a ﬁne objection over the event {t1} since ψ1(¯ x,t1)+ψ3(¯ x,t1)=1 ,
10In fact, it can be shown, that in this example the ﬁne core (with or without incentive
constraints) is empty. The main diﬀerence between this example and Wilson’s (1978)
Example 2 is that in our example each agent’s endowment depends on his own type.
11while their aggregate endowment of the two commodities is 2. If private
information can be shared, as is implicit in the notion of the ﬁne core, then
clearly ¯ x is not viable in state t1. But, in the present example more can be
said to justify a ﬁne objection by agents 1 and 3. Suppose the state is t1,
which consumer 1 knows. Consumer 3 knows that the true state is either
t1 or t2. Consider an oﬀer from consumer 1 to consumer 3 of the allocation
˜ x(t), where
(˜ x1(t), ˜ x3(t)) =
(
((1.1,0),(0.4,0.5)) if t = t1
((ω1(t),ω 3(t)) otherwise
In state t1, the corresponding net-trades are z1(t1)=( 0 .6,−0.5), z3(t1)=
(−0.6,0.5). In state t1, the informed agent gives up 0.5 units of commodity
2 for 0.6 units of commodity 1. Note that t1 is the only state in which
her endowments permit her to make this trade. While 3 does not know
whether the true state is t1 or t2, she does know that the informed agent
would be better oﬀ with this allocation only if the true state is t1; if the
state is actually t2, the net-trade (0.6,−0.5) is infeasible for agent 1. The
informed agent’s claim, that the state is t1, is credible and should, therefore,
be accepted by agent 3. Acceptance of this allocation requires only that
agent 3 infer (correctly) from the allocation that the state is t1, not that 1’s
private information becomes explicitly available to agent 3.11 In this respect
this allocation oﬀers a sensible objection to the status-quo. Agents should be
able to coordinate on an event that can be inferred simply by the fact that
all members of the coalition are willing to sign an allocation that is to their
beneﬁt only on the given event. In the present example, this makes it hard
to justify the coarse core as the appropriate core notion.
We now give an example which shows that unlimited pooling of infor-
mation, which is implicit in the deﬁnition of the ﬁne core, may not be very
appropriate under some circumstances.
Example 3.2
Consider a simpler version of Example 3.1 in which there is only one
commodity, and each consumer has an endowment of 1 unit in each state.
The information structure is the same as in the previous example.
11In the current example, the true state can be inferred from the allocation being pro-
posed. However, this is not the case in general for our notion of a credible objection, to
be deﬁned in the next Section.
12The state-dependent utility functions are as follows.
u1(x,t)=
(








1.5x if t = t2
x otherwise
It is easy to see that the incentive compatible, coarse core contains ¯ x(t),
where ¯ xi(t) = 1 for t/ ∈ T ∗, and
¯ x(t
1)=( 1 ,2,0), ¯ x(t
2)=( 0 ,1,2), ¯ x(t
3)=( 2 ,0,1).
This allocation is not in the incentive compatible, ﬁne core.12 Consumers
1 and 3 have a ﬁne objection over the event {t1} with an allocation ˜ x(t1)
such that ˜ x1(t1)=1+￿ and ˜ x3(t1)=1− ￿ for ￿ ∈ (0,1). In fact, every ﬁne
objection must be of this form. But agent 3 cannot infer from this allocation
that consumer 1 is of type a1 because consumer 1 would prefer the net trade
￿ in both states t1 and t2. Moreover, if the true state is t2, consumer 3 by
agreeing to the allocation ˜ x, and accepting 1’s claim that she is of type a1,
would be worse oﬀ compared to the status-quo ¯ x. In this sense, the ﬁne
objection is not credible. The same argument holds for any ﬁne objection to
an allocation that belongs to the coarse core. In this example, therefore, the
coarse core seems more reasonable than the ﬁne core.
4 The Credible Core
The essential message from the previous examples is that the pooling of
private information between members of a coalition should be permitted if
and only if it can be justiﬁed as being credible. We now develop a notion of
objections which incorporates this consideration.
Suppose each i in coalition S claims, independently, not to be of any type
ˆ ti / ∈ Ei. This type, ˆ ti, cannot be ruled out by agent j ∈ S, with her private
information, if
12As in example 3.1, the incentive compatible, ﬁne core is empty.
13for some t ∈ E, ˆ ti / ∈ Ei, q(t−i,ˆ ti) > 0( 4 .1)
For each i ∈ S let Vi(E) ⊆ Ti \Ei denote the set of all ˆ ti satisfying (4.1). Of
course, if the event E is not a common knowledge event, Vi(E) 6= ∅ for some
i ∈ S.
Our credibility criterion imposes the restriction that none of the types in
Vi(E) should select (or pretend) to be some type in Ei.
Given an admissible event E for coalition S deﬁne for each i ∈ S and
ˆ ti ∈ Vi(E),







Note that this expression is well-deﬁned given the deﬁnition of Vi(E).
For an event admissible for coalition S, we can now deﬁne for each i ∈ S
and a type ˆ ti ∈ Vi(E), the conditional expected utility (conditional on E),
of an allocation x as











Similarly, deﬁne the conditional expected utility of x to ˆ ti ∈ Vi(E)i fˆ ti
pretends to be of type si ∈ Ti as
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Note that this is well-deﬁned since ˆ ti ∈ Vi(E).
Suppose x ∈ AN, y ∈ AS and E is an admissible event for coalition S.
An allocation y is said to satisfy self-selection with respect to x over E if
Ui(y,si | ˆ ti,E) ≤ Ui(x | ˆ ti,E) for all ˆ ti ∈ Vi(E), si ∈ Ei for all i ∈ S (SS).
This constraint can be seen as an extension of (IC) to those types who are
not supposed to be part of the objecting coalition. Notice that, as in (D)
and (IC), the probabilities used in computing conditional expected utility,
are those corresponding to the event E over which the objection is supposed
to take place. By the argument used in proving proposition 2.1, it can be
shown that condition (SS) is equivalent to one in which this inequality is
required to hold for all si ∈ Ti, not just all si ∈ Ei.
14Coalition S is said to have a credible objection to an incentive compatible
allocation x ∈ AN if there exists y ∈ AS and an admissible event E such that
(D), (IC) and (SS) are satisﬁed.
The credible core consists of all incentive compatible allocations to which
there does not exist a credible objection.
We use Example 3.1 again to illustrate the nature of condition (SS). Con-
sider again the allocation ¯ x(t) which we pointed out was not in the incentive
compatible ﬁne core. Let S = {1,3}. Then, the event {t1} is admissible
for S since 1 can discern that t1 is the true state of the world. Consider
the allocation ˜ x speciﬁed there. Since 1 is the only informed agent, we need
only check that (SS) is satisﬁed for 1. Note that V1(t1)={b1}. As we have
pointed out earlier, the net trade involved in ˜ x is not feasible for 1 when her
type is b1. Hence, ˜ x would give her a utility of −∞ if she is of type b1, but
claims to be of type a1. This shows that (SS) is satisﬁed, and so ¯ x is not in
the credible core.
Remark 1. The credible core contains the incentive compatible, ﬁne core,
and is contained in the incentive compatible, coarse core. The ﬁrst inclusion
follows from the observation that an incentive compatible, ﬁne objection is
not required to satisfy (SS). To see the second inclusion, notice that if E is
a common knowledge event for S then Vi(E)=∅ for all i ∈ S, and (SS)
is, therefore, vacuously satisﬁed. In example 3.1, the credible core coincides
with the incentive compatible, ﬁne core, and in example 3.2 it coincides with
the incentive compatible, coarse core. In the next section we will present
an example in which these inclusions are strict, and all three cores are non-
empty.
Remark 2. If incentive constraints, (IC), were to be dropped from the
conditions deﬁning the credible core, it would become identical to the ﬁne
core. This is so because a ﬁne objection y over E by coalition S is then
equivalent to one in which agent i is assigned 0 in every state t such that
t−i ∈ E−i and ti ∈ Vi(E).13 Indeed, if types are veriﬁable as in Wilson (1978),
then the ﬁne core becomes a more appealing concept - there is no reason why
members of a blocking coalition cannot share all their information since false
communication will be detected.
13This observation does not apply to a notion of credibility in which instead of requiring
that the wrong types lose we require that the other (uninformed) agents gain regardless.
This is the idea used by Lee and Volij (2002) in deﬁning the coarse + core, without
imposing incentive constraints.
15The basic logic underlying our notion of the credible core is related to
similar ideas used in other contexts. Most notably, it is similar to the con-
cept of credible updating used by Grossman and Perry in deﬁning a perfect
sequential equilibrium. See also the discussion of the intuitive criterion in
Cho and Kreps (1987) and the discussion in Kahn and Mookherjee (1995)
regarding coalition proof Nash equilibrium under incomplete information.14
It is also related in spirit to the notion of durability studied by Holmstr¨ om
and Myerson (1983).
5 Non-Emptiness of the Credible Core
Recall that in example 3.1 the credible core is empty. Since utility functions
in that example are linear, it follows that appealing to random allocations is
not enough to establish non-emptiness. The aim of this section is to identify
some suﬃcient conditions under which the credible core is non-empty. To do
so, we shall assume throughout this section that utility functions are quasi-
linear. More precisely, we assume that the l-th commodity is money. The
consumption set is then Xi =I R
l−1
+ ×I R and a typical element of Xi is written
as x =( w,m). The utility function in each state is of the form:
ui((w,m),t)=vi(w,t)+m.
Note that the utility functions in example 3.1 are not quasi-linear, even
though indiﬀerence curves are linear.15
We begin with an observation that relates to a special but important
case. Suppose there are two agents, one of whom is uniformed and the other
is informed. Consider a status-quo, x. If there is a credible objection, y,b y
the two agents over an event E, the self-selection constraints imply that an
allocation that prescribes y over E and x over T \ E is also incentive com-
patible. Since this is also feasible in the two-consumer economy, it represents
14As in the intuitive criterion, the speech by an agent making a claim about her type
is: ‘If I am of the wrong type I would not gain over the status-quo, so you should believe
me’. Think of status-quo as the equilibrium. It can be broken if there is a way to signal
information in a credible way which would make them all better oﬀ. In the coarse core,
breaking the equilibrium is diﬃcult because it has to be common knowledge that all types
are better-oﬀ.
15That example is equivalent to one with quasi linear preferences only if one relaxes the
assumption of a common prior.
16an incentive compatible coarse objection.16
Remark 3. In a quasi-linear economy with two agents, one informed and
one uninformed, the credible core coincides with the incentive compatible,
coarse core, and is, therefore, non-empty.
Coalition S is said to have an ex post objection to x ∈ AN if there exists
yS ∈ AS and t ∈ T such that ui(yi,t) >u i(xi,t) for all i ∈ S. The ex post
core is the set of all allocations in AN to which no coalition has an ex post
objection. It is the set of allocations that correspond to the classical core of
the (complete information) ex post economy E(t)={(Xi,u i(.,t),ω i(t))} for
all t ∈ T.
Conditions under which the ex post core is non-empty are well known. In
particular, it is non-empty in classical exchange economies with continuous,
monotonic and convex preferences and convex consumption sets. Another
case that will be of special interest to us is the one of an assignment model
(Shapley and Shubik (1972)) in which Forges (2002) has established (allow-
ing for random allocations) non-emptiness of the incentive compatible, coarse
core.17 A leading example of such a model is that of several potential sellers
and buyers, where each seller has one unit of an indivisible object, and prefer-
ences are quasi-linear. In this model, too, the ex post core is non-empty; see
Shapley and Shubik (1972) and Quinzii (1984). In the quasi linear setting,
this is useful for our purposes, as the following result shows.
Proposition 5.1 If utility functions are quasi-linear, every allocation in the
ex post core belongs to the ﬁne core, and the latter is, therefore, non-empty.
Proof. Suppose not, i.e, suppose there exists x in the ex post core but not
in the ﬁne core. Then, there exists a coalition S, an admissible event E and




























16Except for the fact that types not in E are not strictly better-oﬀ. However, quasi-
linearity makes it possible to achieve this by transferring a small constant amount from
the uninformed agent to the informed.
17Whether her result can be extended to cover the credible core remains an open ques-
tion.









































Since utility functions are quasi-linear this means that coalition S has an ex
post objection in state t. But this contradicts the supposition that x belongs
to the ex post core.
Of course, this result does not address incentiveissues, and for that reason
alone does not directly help in terms of non-emptiness of the credible core.
However, if we can ﬁnd an ex post core allocation that is incentivecompatible,
then it would follow that such an allocation belongs to the credible core. We
record this implication as a corollary.
Corollary 5.1 If utility functions are quasi-linear and there exists an in-
centive compatible allocation, x, in the ex post core, then x belongs to the
incentive compatible ﬁne core, and, therefore, to the credible core.
In the general, the condition that there exist an incentive compatible al-
location in the ex post core is a strong one. In fact, it is not to be expected
even in simple buyer-seller models with two-sided incompleteness of infor-
mation, as shown by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). However, a special
case in which this property is known to hold is one in which the values of one
side of the market are known. For example if the sellers’ values are know, a
buyer optimal mechanism in the ex post core is incentive compatible; see for
example section 8.4 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990). This yields the following.
Corollary 5.2 In the assignment model, the credible core is non-empty if
the valuations of one side of the market are known and values are private.
18Of course, the case of a single seller is a special case of the assignment
model, and the second-price auction yields an allocation in the credible core.
It is possible to generalize this positive result, for a single unit auction, in
another direction. Suppose buyers have interdependent values. Even in this
case, it is easy to see that the ex post core consists, in each state, of allocating
the object to a highest valuation agent, and transferring from this agent to
the seller an amount of money between the highest and the second highest
valuation. If valuations satisfy the single crossing property, the generalized
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism yields such an allocation as an ex post
equilibrium, which implies incentive compatibility; see Proposition 10.1 in
Krishna (2002). This gives us our next result.
Corollary 5.3 The credible core is non-empty in an auction model where
valuations satisfy the single crossing property.
Another case in which non-emptiness can be established is one in which
information is non-exclusive. Postlewaite and Schmeidler(1986) use this ter-
minology to describe an information structure in which the information of
any individual agent can be deduced by pooling the information of all the
others. Formally, information is non-exclusive if for every i ∈ N and t ∈ T ∗,
q(ti | t−i)=1 .
When information is non-exclusive, any unilateral deception can be de-
tected, and so incentive compatibility is easy to satisfy. In particular, for any
interim individually rational allocation x ∈ AN, there is another allocation
ˆ x ∈ AN which gives every i the same interim utility as x, and is incentive
compatible.18 Hence,
Corollary 5.4 If information is non-exclusive and the ex post core is non-
empty, then the credible core is non-empty.
While corollaries 5.2 and 5.3 refer to speciﬁc allocations, the credible
core is generally larger, as we will now illustrate. The following example
will also serve to show that the incentive compatible ﬁne core can be strictly
contained in the credible core, which in turn can be a strict subset of the
incentive compatible, coarse core.
Example 5.1
18See Lemma 3.1 in Vohra(1999).










The seller has 0 as reservation value. Types are equally likely.
Ex-post eﬃcient allocations are characterized simply by the property that
the object be allocated to buyer 2 in state (tL
1,t H
2 ) and to buyer 1 in all other
states. The allocation corresponding to the second price auction is one such
allocation that has the stronger property of belonging to the ex post core.
Since this allocation is also incentive compatible, it follows from Corollary
5.1 that it belongs to the incentive compatible ﬁne core. The net utilities of









For instance, in state (tH
1 ,t H
2 ) buyer 1 receives the object and pays the seller
6. As pointed out above, this allocation belongs to the incentive compatible
ﬁne core, and therefore also to the credible core and the incentive compatible
coarse core. The fact that all these cores are non-empty in this setting makes
it possible to make a meaningful comparison between the various cores, as
summarized by the following observations.
The incentive compatible ﬁne core contains allocations that are not
in the ex-post core.
In a model with asymmetric information, it is possible to sustain some
kind of core stability while providing an ‘informational rent’; see, for instance,
Example 3.1 in Vohra (1999). In the present example, consider the following
modiﬁcation to the second-price auction mechanism in the states where buyer








This is not in the ex-post core because in state (tL
1,t L
2), buyer 2 receives
a transfer even though the commodity is transferred to buyer 1. However,
this allocation is in the ﬁne core. Even if buyer 1 and the seller can share
20their private information, they wouldn’t know the type of buyer 2. When
buyer 1 is of the low type, the maximum expected surplus she can get with
the seller is 5. And that cannot provide an improvement over the status-
quo. The transfer to buyer 2 in (tL
1,t L
2) can be seen as a result of buyer 2’s
contribution to the aggregate surplus in state (tL
1,t H
2 ).
The credible core contains allocations that are not in the incentive
compatible ﬁne core.








The fact that buyer 2 receives a positive transfer in state (tH
1 ,t H
2 ) means that
this mechanism is not in the ex post core, and hence not in the ﬁne core.
However, this allocation does belong to the credible core. When agent 1 is
of the high type, her expected payoﬀ in this allocation is 5. So, to make an
objection, she has to oﬀer a price less than 5, (but greater than 4.5). But,
then buyer 1 of type tL
1 would also make this oﬀer.
The incentive compatible coarse core contains allocations that are
not in the credible core.








However, this is not in the credible core. Buyer 1 of the high type can signal
his type in a credible way to avoid a transfer to buyer 2 in (tH
1 ,t H
2 ). In
particular, if buyer 1 oﬀers to buy the object at a price of 5.1, it is obvious
that she is of the high type (since the low type’s valuation is 5), and both
she and the seller are better-oﬀ with such an allocation.
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